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ABSTRACT 
Despite the efficacy of mindfulness-based interventions for a wide range of psychological 
problems, their mechanisms remain unknown. Analogue studies of key treatment components 
can help distinguish these approaches. One such component, focused-breathing meditation, has 
rarely been studied in direct comparison to another active and theoretically distinct technique, 
cognitive reappraisal. The present study examined the effects of mindful breathing and cognitive 
reappraisal instructions on negative affect and executive control, two potential mechanisms of 
mindfulness, in a laboratory setting. Non-clinical college undergraduates (N = 136) were 
randomly assigned to a 10-minute mindfulness, reappraisal, or mind-wandering control 
condition. Contrary to hypotheses, no between-group differences were found in sadness ratings, 
state mindfulness, or the inhibitory control dimension of executive control following the 
intervention. The mindfulness condition showed lower inattention compared to the mind-
wandering condition. Implications of these results are discussed in terms of specific theoretical 
mechanisms of mindfulness- and cognitive-reappraisal-based interventions. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Recent years have seen a proliferation of psychotherapies that incorporate, either 
explicitly or implicitly, elements of mindfulness, a concept with roots in Buddhist philosophy 
and practice (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007). These therapies include Mindfulness-Based 
Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, Massion, Kristeller, & Peterson., 1992), Mindfulness-
Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), and Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Mindfulness-based therapies 
have demonstrated effectiveness for a wide variety of psychological problems, including 
depression and anxiety (Baer, 2003; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010). Mindfulness-based 
therapies are theorized to yield their clinical effectiveness (e.g., symptoms reduction) by 
promoting clients’ dispositional mindfulness or their application of mindfulness skills to regulate 
emotion and behavior more adaptively (Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2004; Hayes, Villatte, Levin, 
& Hildebrandt, 2011). 
There is considerable evidence that multi-week mindfulness-based interventions produce 
increases in trait, or dispositional, mindfulness, and increasing evidence that these increases 
predict and even mediate post-program symptom reduction or increased well-being (Carmody & 
Baer, 2008; Keng, Smoski, & Robins, 2011). While these findings bolster a theoretical argument 
that increases in mindfulness mediate treatment outcome for mindfulness-based therapies, they 
do not elucidate the mechanism by which mindfulness itself produces these beneficial outcomes. 
More research on the mechanisms of change in psychosocial interventions is essential, both for 
psychotherapies in general (Kazdin, 2005) and for mindfulness-based treatments in particular 
(Baer, 2003; Hayes & Wilson, 2003; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). Mechanisms 
research investigates “how” or “why” psychological treatments have their salutary effects. 
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Laboratory analogue experiments, such as the proposed study, are well suited to examining such 
questions (Kazdin, 2005; Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012). An analogue study can 
isolate components of a larger treatment package, control with greater precision the precise 
“dosage” of each component that participants receive, and assess potential mediators and 
outcomes more immediately, in a controlled setting. 
The present analogue study explored the immediate effects of a brief mindfulness 
intervention on affect and executive control. The study had two chief aims: First, it sought to 
replicate findings (Keng, Robins, Smoski, Dagenbach, & Leary, 2013; Broderick, 2005; 
Hufziger & Kuehner, 2009; Arch & Craske, 2006; Erisman & Roemer, 2010) on the short-term 
effects of brief mindfulness training on negative affect and to examine whether those effects 
were accompanied by improvements in executive control. Second, it sought to compare brief 
mindfulness training to an active control, cognitive reappraisal instructions, to clarify points of 
similarity and difference in their immediate effects. 
1.1 Defining Mindfulness  
Among prevailing definitions of mindfulness, perhaps the most widely-cited are those by 
MBSR developer Jon Kabat-Zinn, who has described mindfulness as “an open-hearted, moment-
to-moment, non-judgmental awareness” (Kabat-Zinn, 2005, p. 24) and “paying attention in a 
particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 
4).1 These descriptions are evocative and consistent with how mindfulness is commonly taught in 
Western meditation training programs. Yet Kabat-Zinn’s descriptions are intended primarily for 
a lay audience and for clinical applications, and as such, they leave ambiguous certain key 
                                                 
1 Langer (1989, 1997) has developed a research program based on a distinct definition of mindfulness that 
emphasizes its relationship to creativity, problem-solving, and the ability to adopt multiple perspectives. Langer’s 
model of mindfulness does not assume a relationship between mindfulness meditation practice and the cultivation of 
mindfulness as a trait or state, however. It thus has less relevance to the clinical applications of mindfulness training 
of interest in this review and will not be discussed. 
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issues—whether mindfulness is unidimensional, for instance, or how “open-heartedness” or 
“non-judgment” might be operationalized. Hayes and Wilson (2003), among others, have 
critiqued popular definitions like Kabat-Zinn’s for leaving unclear whether mindfulness is a 
psychological process with particular downstream outcomes, a method for achieving certain 
outcomes, or an outcome itself (Hayes & Wilson, 2003). For the purposes of empirical research, 
mindfulness is still a poorly-defined psychological construct. 
The absence of a consensus definition has led to a proliferation of various, competing 
definitions of mindfulness (e.g. Chiesa, 2013; Bergomi, Tschacher, & Kupper, 2013; Bishop et 
al., 2004). Mindfulness has been defined both as a stable trait (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003; Baer 
et al., 2006) and as a transient psychological state (Lau et al., 2006). Most self-report scales of 
mindfulness purport to assess it as a trait-level construct, with only two widely used scales 
assessing state mindfulness (Toronto Mindfulness Scale; Lau et al., 2006; Mindful Awareness 
and Attention Scale – State Version; Brown & Ryan, 2003). Even among trait mindfulness 
scales, however, there is considerable variability in definitions of the construct. The Mindful 
Awareness and Attention Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) measures mindfulness as a 
unitary construct reflecting present-moment awareness, or the absence of “mindlessness.” By 
contrast, the Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire (SMQ; Chadwick et al., 2008) and 
Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale-Revised (CAMS-R; Feldman et al., 2007) both 
conceptualize mindfulness as a particular way of responding to distress, affect or cognitions. The 
Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) presents yet another 
conceptualization of mindfulness, this time derived from an exploratory factor analysis of other 
mindfulness scales, as a multifaceted construct that includes attentional and behavioral 
components, as well as an ability to describe or label internal experience.  
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Because each conceptual definition of mindfulness implicates specific potential 
mechanisms for its salutary effects on psychological health, the variation in definitions across 
self-report scales contributes to confusion about how mindfulness “works.” To address this 
confusion, Bishop and colleagues (2004) attempted to develop a consensus definition of 
mindfulness with specific claims about its potential mechanisms. Bishop et al. (2004) stated that 
mindfulness consists of two components: 1) “self-regulation of attention so that it is maintained 
on immediate experience,” and 2) “an orientation [toward one’s inner experience] that is 
characterized by curiosity, openness, and acceptance” (Bishop et al., 2004, p. 232). This model 
conceptualizes mindfulness as a “state-like phenomenon” (p. 237), arising from the practice of 
formal meditation, and also “similar to a skill that can be developed with practice.” In Hayes and 
Wilson’s (2003) formulation, then, Bishop et al. define mindfulness as a “process” arising 
specifically from the “method” of meditation or mindfulness training.  
The same research team also developed the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau et al., 
2006) to assess mindfulness immediately following a meditation practice period. Interestingly, 
factor analysis of the final TMS items failed to replicate the two-dimensional Bishop et al. 
(2004) structure, instead yielding two factors (Curiosity and Decentering) most closely 
associated with the only the second, attitudinal facet of mindfulness (Lau et al., 2006). A trait 
measure, the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS; Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & 
Farrow, 2008) was also developed explicitly based on the Bishop et al. (2004) consensus 
definition and has a confirmed two-factor structure directly corresponding to the model’s 
attention and acceptance facets. Feldman and colleagues also based the CAMS-R on this model, 
and while the final CAMS-R has a four-factor structure, these facets closely parallel the Bishop 
et al. model as well. Other trait mindfulness scales, such as the FFMQ or MAAS, however, do 
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not contradict this definition so much as they differ in their points of emphasis, positing that 
mindfulness can be measured outside of formal meditation practice or that it can consist of a 
broader or narrower range of psychological processes. Thus the Bishop et al. model has not 
definitively resolved issues in measuring mindfulness. 
A key advantage of Bishop and colleagues’ definition, however, is that it implicates 
specific, measurable attentional processes as correlates or outcomes of mindfulness (Bishop et 
al., 2004; Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008). Importantly, not only are these processes 
plausibly enhanced in individuals with high dispositional mindfulness, they are also plausible 
correlates of a mindful state achieved during or immediately following meditation practice. In 
most forms of meditation, the practitioner attempts to sustain her attention on a particular object 
of focus. Upon noticing that her mind has wandered from this object to other sensations or 
thoughts, she switches her attention back to the original meditative object. She also attempts to 
let go of evaluative or elaborative patterns of thought, inhibiting these more discursive modes of 
cognition. Thus, Bishop and colleagues argue, dispositional mindfulness and meditation practice 
should be associated with improvements in sustained attention, attentional flexibility or set 
switching, and response inhibition (Bishop et al,. 2004).  
This study adhered to the Bishop et al. (2004) definition of mindfulness in regarding 
mindfulness as consisting of self-regulated attention to present experience, conducted with a 
nonjudgmental and accepting orientation. Drawing on Bishop and colleagues’ proposed 
mechanisms, the study explored the contributions of mindfulness to two potential correlates: 
enhanced sustained attention and inhibitory control. While these executive processes represent 
candidate mechanisms of mindfulness, though, improved sustained attention or inhibitory control 
alone is not an adequate account of how mindfulness leads to psychological well-being. To 
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explain mindfulness’ salutary effects on psychological health, one must also address 
mindfulness’ relationship to negative affect or distress, the primary target of most clinical 
applications of mindfulness (Khoury et al., 2013). Recent theoretical and empirical work has 
filled this gap by placing mindfulness, as defined by Bishop et al. (2004), within the framework 
of emotion regulation (e.g., Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009; Hayes & Feldman, 2004; Farb, 
Anderson, Irving, & Segal, 2012). 
1.2 Mindfulness and Emotion Regulation  
As presented by Gross (2007), emotion regulation refers to the process of modulating 
one’s emotional experience or responses to emotion-eliciting stimuli. Emotion regulation has 
been called “the processes by which we influence which emotions we have, when we have them, 
and how we experience and express them” (Gross, 2002, p. 282). Maladaptive emotion 
regulation, or emotional dysregulation, is presumed to be a common feature across 
psychopathologies (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Werner & Gross, 2004). Many psychological 
interventions in turn purport to target emotion regulation, by teaching more adaptive emotion 
regulation strategies, usually with the aim of reducing distress by altering the frequency, 
intensity or duration of positive or negative emotional experiences (e.g., Mennin, 2004; Liverant, 
Brown, Barlow & Roemer, 2008).  
Gross’ process model of emotion (1998) identifies emotion regulation strategies that 
theoretically operate at different stages of the emotion generation process. These strategies 
include distraction, suppression, reappraisal and acceptance, among others. Distraction and 
reappraisal have been described as “antecedent-focused” strategies, as they theoretically operate 
early in the emotion generation process, affecting attentional deployment toward and initial 
cognitive appraisals of a stimulus (Gross, 1998). Research has identified certain strategies (e.g., 
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reappraisal) as generally adaptive, and others as generally maladaptive (e.g., rumination, 
suppression), in terms of their association with psychopathology and/or effects on subsequent 
affect, cognition or behavior (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010). For example, expressive 
suppression, an effortful attempt not to express the behavioral signs of a particular emotion, 
entails the evaluation that a particular emotion is bad or unwanted and can paradoxically increase 
the experience of that emotion (Gross & John, 2003). 
Although mindfulness is not part of Gross’ canonical set of emotion regulation strategies, 
some researchers have conceptualized mindfulness as a technique or strategy for handling 
difficult emotions (e.g., Hayes & Feldman, 2004; Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009; Farb et al., 
2013). Conceptualizing mindfulness as a form of emotion regulation is particularly appropriate 
when considering clinical applications of meditation and mindfulness training, rather than the 
mere phenomenology of mindfulness. Although these accounts of mindful emotion regulation 
differ in some respects, they all recognize that mindfulness’ emphasis on nonjudgment is 
antithetical to some maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, such as expressive suppression.  
In addition, most attempts to integrate mindfulness with the emotion regulation literature 
note that mindfulness could act as what Farb and colleagues (2013) term a “meta-strategy” (p. 
551). By enhancing awareness of one’s habitual responses to emotional stimuli, and reducing 
these automatic response tendencies (e.g., Wenk-Sormaz, 2005; Kang, Gruber, & Gray, 2013), 
mindfulness could facilitate the flexible, context-specific application of other emotion regulation 
strategies. Increasingly, flexibility in the application or use of regulation strategies is regarded as 
a key individual difference indicator of psychological health, rather than strict reliance on so-
called “adaptive” strategies (e.g., Aldao, 2013; Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; Bonanno & 
Burton, 2013).  
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Studies of state mindfulness are necessarily more limited in their ability to assess emotion 
regulation flexibility, however, and thus most laboratory studies of brief mindfulness training 
have examined self-reported affective responses to a stressor. Interestingly, though, the 
experimental literature on emotion regulation, when it has addressed mindfulness at all, has 
typically treated it as a variant of distraction (e.g., Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012) or acceptance 
(e.g., Kohl, Rief, & Glombiewski, 2012) strategies. Mindfulness, as defined by Bishop et al. 
(2004), certainly shares features with distraction, as both strategies require attentional control. 
Distraction entails the effortful deployment of attention to an object other than an aversive 
emotional stimulus, however. By contrast, mindful attention to the present moment does not 
preclude attending to the emotional experience and would likely involve some awareness of an 
aversive stimulus in the present moment. It is true that in the early stages of formal meditation 
training, mindfulness might resemble distraction more closely, as novice meditators are typically 
instructed to focus their attention on a specific meditational object, such as the physical 
sensations of the breath (Lutz et al., 2008). Nevertheless, even in the context of novice 
meditators, mindfulness does not fit easily into a traditional taxonomy of emotion regulation 
strategies because of its simultaneous stipulation of an accepting, nonjudgmental stance toward 
emotions. Noting that distraction can be characterized by an almost opposite stance of 
withdrawal from aversive emotion, Farb et al. (2013) describe mindfulness as a distinct form of 
emotion regulation in that it represents “approach-oriented attention deployment” (p. 550). 
1.2.1 Brief mindfulness interventions in emotion regulation.   
Experimental research also supports the possibility that brief mindfulness training can 
enhance emotion regulation. These studies typically use a short (10-15 minute) meditation 
exercise and assess emotion regulation via self-reported mood ratings following a mood 
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induction or emotional challenge. Laboratory-based mindfulness training interventions, such as 
brief focused-breathing meditation practice, have been shown to reduce negative affect, relative 
to distraction and rumination conditions, when the exercise follows an experimental sad mood 
induction (Broderick, 2005; Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009; Kuehner, Huffziger, & Liebsch, 2009). 
Mindfulness and acceptance manipulations have also demonstrated a buffering effect in lab 
studies, reducing negative affective response to a subsequent emotional stressor relative to 
rumination, distraction and worry (Arch & Craske, 2006; Erisman & Roemer, 2010; Keng et al., 
2013; Singer & Dobson, 2007). Some conflicting findings in this literature warrant closer 
examination, however. 
In two studies with nearly identical designs, Huffziger, Kuehner and colleagues 
(Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009; Kuehner et al., 2009) examined the effects of 8-minute 
mindfulness instructions on experimentally-induced negative mood in comparison to rumination 
and distraction instructions. These studies employed the same mood induction procedure, in 
which participants recalled three negative autobiographical events and then incubated this mood 
for several minutes, and then received instructions in mindfulness or a comparison strategy, 
either rumination or distraction. In a sample of previously depressed adults (the majority 
remitted, but including some with residual or full depressive symptoms), mindfulness training 
and distraction both reduced negative affect and increased positive affect as compared to 
rumination (Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009). By contrast, in a non-clinical student sample, 
distraction evidenced the same improvements in mood with respect to rumination, but 
mindfulness training did not significantly differ from either rumination or distraction in its 
effects on positive or negative affect (Kuehner, Huffziger, & Liebsch, 2009). Given that the 
mood induction produced significantly deleterious effects on affect in both samples, these 
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discrepant findings may be indicative of differences in the responsiveness of clinical and healthy 
populations to mindfulness or reappraisal instructions. Indeed, another analogue study with a 
remitted depressed population found that training in acceptance, using a script based on MBCT, 
was superior to rumination or no training, and comparable to distraction, in attenuating the 
negative emotional response to a subsequent mood induction (Singer & Dobson, 2007). 
Erisman and Roemer (2010) obtained similarly mixed results from an experimental 
comparison of mindfulness and neutral educational control instructions with an analogue clinical 
sample. Students endorsing elevated difficulties in emotion regulation viewed affectively-laden 
film clips before and after brief mindfulness training, delivered via audio recording, or a control 
(educational) condition. The brief mindfulness training was 10 minutes long and relatively 
extensive when compared to other such brief instructions.  In addition to providing a description 
of mindfulness and brief instructions in mindful awareness of breathing instructions, and an 
opportunity to practice mindfulness of breath, the mindfulness intervention also included an 
explanation of applying mindfulness to emotional experiences, and a mindfulness of emotions 
exercise focused on noticing responses to a poem.  Participants in the mindfulness condition 
reported greater decentering on the TMS, indicating that the training was successful at inducing 
an aspect of state mindfulness.  Mindfulness participants also reported greater positive affect in 
response to a positive emotional film clip and less negative affect in response to a clip with 
mixed affective content. There were no significant differences in self-reported affect between 
conditions, however. This finding was especially notable for negative affect in response to 
distressing film clips, as these were arguably the emotional stimuli most similar to the negative 
mood inductions used in the studies discussed above. With only 15 participants in each 
condition, Erisman and Roemer’s (2010) study may have lacked statistical power to detect these 
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between-condition effects. It is also possible, though, that mindfulness and distraction act 
similarly or with similar efficacy on emotions elicited through film clips. Watching emotional 
film clips involving third parties may evoke different emotions than negative autobiographical 
recall, and distraction and mindfulness may be equivalent strategies in regulating such empathic 
emotions. 
Yet other studies of brief mindfulness training with healthy samples have found benefits 
of mindfulness over distraction, as well as other putatively maladaptive (e.g., rumination) and 
neutral comparison conditions. Broderick (2005) administered a negative mood induction to 
healthy, meditation-naïve students, then provided instructions in either rumination distraction or 
mindfulness. Participants who received the 8-minute audio-recorded mindfulness training 
reported significantly lower post-training levels of negative affect than those receiving 
distraction or rumination instructions, with participants in the distraction condition reporting 
levels of negative affect between those in the mindfulness and rumination conditions. As 
mindfulness was the only experimental condition involving audio instructions, methodological 
differences between conditions might partially account for Broderick’s findings. However, Arch 
and Craske (2006) obtained similar results from a healthy student sample using audio-recorded 
instructions in all three of their experimental conditions. Arch and Craske (2006) compared 
focused-breathing meditation instructions to worry and unfocused attention conditions, 
examining training-related changes in participants self-reported affect in response to viewing 
affectively-valenced images. Participants in the focused-breathing group reported less negative 
affect in response to negative slides presented after training than did those in the worry group. A 
similar but non-significant trend was present between the focused-breathing and unfocused 
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attention conditions. With 20 participants in each condition, Arch and Craske’s (2006) study also 
may have been underpowered to detect such a difference.  
Using similar, 10-minute focused-breathing meditation instructions with a healthy student 
sample, Ortner and Zelazo (2014) failed to find meditation-specific increases in either of the 
TMS state mindfulness subscales, when compared to a guided-imagery distraction exercise.  
Distraction and mindfulness also produced equivalent reductions in negative affect and anger on 
an anger-provoking writing task. However, both TMS-Decentering and TMS-Curiosity 
interacted with condition to predict negative affect and anger, such that decentering and curiosity 
only predicted improvements in both affective outcomes for participants receiving mindfulness 
instructions. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that brief mindfulness training can produce 
salutary effects on negative mood in healthy samples, even in comparison to other neutral or 
potentially adaptive strategies like distraction. Emerging findings also suggest that such brief 
training can induce decentering—a component of state mindfulness as assessed by the TMS—in 
healthy (Feldman, Greeson, & Senville, 2010) or analogue clinical populations (Erisman & 
Roemer, 2010) and that state mindfulness may ameliorate subsequent negative affective 
responding (Ortner & Zelazo, 2014). Still, it remains unclear whether meditation-specific 
increases in state mindfulness coincide with these reductions in negative affect and by what 
mechanism mindfulness diminishes this response in experimental settings.  
1.3 Executive Processes in Mindful Emotion Regulation 
Almost all definitions of mindfulness explicitly treat mindfulness, whether trait or state, as 
entailing a particular quality of attention. From a neuroscientific perspective, mindfulness 
training is believed to enhance emotion regulation via improvements in attention and executive 
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functioning more broadly. Specifically mindfulness may enhance adaptive emotion regulation in 
mood disorders by reducing habitual modes of cognitive elaboration in favor of sustained 
attention and monitoring associated with the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), among other 
regions (Farb, Anderson, & Segal, 2012).  
A growing body of literature supports the view that mindfulness is associated with, and 
may even improve, executive functions. Executive function encompasses a variety of cognitive 
processes theoretically linked to frontal lobe activity and more complex, planned, controlled or 
flexible behavior than is typically associated with more basic functions like attention (Suchy, 
2009). Although definitions of these processes vary somewhat, commonly recognized executive 
functions include selective and sustained attention, shifting mental sets, updating and monitoring 
working memory, and inhibiting prepotent responses (Miyake et al., 2000; Banich, 2009). 
Individuals with greater meditation experience perform better than controls on measures of 
sustained attention, change blindness, visual perspective shifting and visual selective attention 
(Valentine & Sweet, 1999; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Hodgins & Adair, 2010).  
These associations are also borne out in studies of meditation training programs, 
suggesting that multi-day or multi-week mindfulness interventions may enhance executive 
functioning (Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Tang et al., 2007). 
Some evidence also supports the efficacy of even briefer mindfulness interventions in enhancing 
some aspects of executive functioning.  In an early study involving three 20-minute training 
sessions over the three days, Wenk-Sormaz (2005) found evidence that meditation training 
decreased healthy participants’ interference on the Stroop task, a measure of response inhibition, 
as compared to educational and rest control conditions. Two more recent studies suggest that this 
immediate effect on Stroop performance can be achieved with even briefer periods of meditation 
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training. Lee and Orsillo (2014) administered an emotional Stroop task to participants with 
elevated GAD symptoms after they received 20-minute training in mindfulness, relaxation, or a 
mind-wandering control exercise intended to exacerbate GAD-related worry. Participants in the 
mindfulness condition demonstrated reduced Stroop interference as compared to mind-
wandering but not relaxation, suggesting that a brief mindfulness induction can improve 
inhibitory control with respect to an analogue pathological condition but perhaps not in 
comparison to another analogue clinical intervention. However, Keng and colleagues (2013) 
found that a mindfulness condition significantly reduced depressed participants’ interference on 
the classic Stroop task as compared to cognitive reappraisal, despite employing an even briefer, 
10-minute mindfulness induction period. Methodological differences in populations (healthy vs. 
GAD vs. depression) or the use of a mood induction before testing Stroop performance might 
account for some of the variability in these findings. 
 Nevertheless, these experimental studies suggest that brief mindfulness training 
can produce immediate effects on inhibitory control in analogue clinical populations that are 
similar to those found after extended, multi-week meditation training programs. More research is 
needed to elucidate how these short-term effects relate to the general benefits of mindfulness for 
psychological well-being. The other potential executive processes affected by longer-term 
mindfulness training, such as sustained attention, have not been studied in the context of these 
brief, experimental settings. This experimental research has also largely been conducted with 
analogue clinical samples (with disorder-specific study designs) and employed only one measure 
of inhibitory control, the Stroop task. Finally, aside from one study (Keng et al., 2013), no 
experimental investigations of brief mindfulness inductions have examined mindfulness’ 
putative effects on executive function in the context of the emotion regulatory benefits of 
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mindfulness that have been well established in the experimental literature. Such examination of 
concurrent executive and affective processes in brief mindfulness training is not only a gap in the 
literature, it is also increasingly indicated by emerging research in the mechanisms of 
mindfulness. 
1.3.1 Executive control as a mechanism of mindful emotion regulation.  
Recently, studies have used the enhanced temporal specificity of electroencephalography 
(EEG) to corroborate the potential significance of enhanced executive functioning in the emotion 
regulatory effects of mindfulness. Teper and Inzlicht (2013) found that experienced meditators 
exhibit a heightened error-related negativity, an event-related potential (ERP) associated with an 
ACC-driven negative emotional reaction, to their own errors on the Stroop task, as compared to 
non-meditators. They propose that, by enhancing conflict-monitoring and executive control 
abilities, mindfulness allows people to regulate their negative emotional response to failure 
feedback more rapidly, thus facilitating adaptive responding (Teper, Segal, & Inzlicht, 2013). 
This theory is consistent with prior findings that mindfulness enhances flexibility in behavioral 
paradigms that include reinforcement, facilitating extinction and reducing stimulus over-
selectivity (McHugh, Simpson, & Reed, 2010; McHugh et al., 2012; McHugh & Wood, 2013).  
Other EEG studies indicate that trait mindfulness is associated with altered responding to 
emotional stimuli at the level of attentional deployment. Individuals higher in dispositional 
mindfulness have demonstrated attenuated immediate emotional responses to high arousal 
unpleasant images (Brown, Goodman, & Inzlicht, 2013) and less neural differentiation of 
rewarding and neutral feedback (Teper & Inzlicht, 2014). Cross-sectionally, trait mindfulness is 
positively associated with both self-reported emotion regulation ability and behavioral traits 
linked to the prefrontal systems presumed to underlie executive functions (Lyvers et al., 2013). 
16 
Neuroscience findings further complicate the relationship between trait mindfulness and 
the role of executive processes in mindful emotion regulation. Using functional neuroimaging, 
Taylor and colleagues (2011) found functional neuroimaging evidence that meditation 
experience is associated with distinct mechanisms of state mindfulness. For both experienced 
and novice meditators, a state mindfulness induction reduced emotional intensity in response to 
affective pictures. For experienced meditators, state mindfulness was associated with 
deactivation in default mode network regions (medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices) 
and not with changes in amygdala activity. By contrast, though, novice meditators practicing 
mindfulness showed increased activity in the medial frontal gyrus and decreased amygdala 
activity. Taylor et al. (2011) suggest that, in beginners, mindfulness practice involves active 
down-regulation of emotional responding (similar to reappraisal), while for experienced 
meditators, mindfulness involves acceptance and reductions in elaboration and reappraisal. 
Reviewing neuroimaging studies of mindfulness and emotion regulation, Chiesa, Serretti, and 
Jakobsen (2013) concluded that the extant evidence does indicate distinct mechanisms at 
differing levels of meditation experience. For novice meditators, they argue, mindfulness training 
appears to involve “top-down” emotion regulation, recruiting prefrontal regions to down-regulate 
limbic activity, while for experienced meditators, mindfulness practice is associated with a more 
“bottom-up” emotion regulation strategy characterized by decreased activity in default mode 
network areas. Thus, for novices, meditation practice may be especially likely to involve 
increased executive control, including sustained attention and inhibition, similar to reappraisal 
(Chiesa et al., 2013).  
Limited research has been conducted on the role of executive processes in laboratory-
based studies of mindful emotion regulation. Fergus, Wheless, and Wright (2014) compared 
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mindful-breathing—paired with progressive muscle relaxation (PMR)—to the attention training 
technique (ATT), a component of Wells’ (2009) metacognitive therapy. The ATT is structured to 
target the self-focused attention characteristic of worry and depressive rumination by training 
selective attention, divided attention and attentional switching in response to auditory stimuli 
(Wells, 2009). Fergus and colleagues compared the effects of these two techniques on changes in 
nonclinical undergraduates’ self-reported state anxiety and attentional focus (internal vs. 
external, rated dimensionally by a single-item 7-point scale). Both ATT and mindfulness-plus-
PMR reduced self-reported anxiety, but the techniques had differential effects on attention, with 
ATT producing reductions in self-focused attention and mindfulness training increasing self-
focused attention.  In their experimental comparison of mindfulness and reappraisal, Keng et al. 
(2013) found that both active interventions reduced negative affect following the mood 
induction, with respect to no training, but that participants receiving mindfulness made fewer 
errors on the subsequent Stroop task. The authors interpreted this result as indicating that both 
interventions, when applied as “online” emotion regulation strategies, depleted participants’ 
cognitive resources, but that mindfulness incurred relatively fewer cognitive costs, perhaps 
because it involves less voluntary control over cognitive content. This cognitive-depletion 
interpretation is compelling, but differences between the two intervention scripts could account 
for the increased cognitive “cost” of reappraisal in this particular study without indicating a 
fundamental difference between the two strategies. For example, the reappraisal script that Keng 
et al. (2013) used asked participants to imagine a hypothetical scenario (an ambiguous social 
situation), which they then reinterpreted. The mindfulness script offered a potential imaginal 
image as guidance for participants but did not require participants to imagine a specific scene in 
detail and thus presumably required less effort. More importantly, the cognitive-depletion 
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account of Keng and colleagues’ findings ignores a significant aspect of the theoretical 
distinction between reappraisal and mindfulness: although mindfulness involves less cognitive 
elaboration than reappraisal, it also involves, at least in the early stages of training, a distinct 
form of attention. 
1.4 Experimental Comparisons of Mindfulness and Reappraisal 
Direct comparisons of mindfulness and reappraisal are fraught because the nature of 
relationship between mindfulness and cognitive reappraisal remains controversial. Proponents of 
the “third wave” or contextual approach to CBT typically claim that mindfulness-based therapies 
are part of this more recent response to traditional CBT (Hayes, 2004; Hayes et al., 2011). 
Hayes’ and colleagues’ argue that, despite their diverse origins and target disorders, contextual 
behavior therapies are alike in that they “target the context and function of psychological events 
such as thoughts, sensations, or emotions, rather than primarily targeting the content, validity, 
intensity, or frequency of such events” (Hayes et al., 2011, pp. 157-158). Proponents of the 
contextual approach argue that traditional CBT takes this latter approach, directly targeting 
cognitive content and attempting to change it through techniques like cognitive restructuring or 
reappraisal. This distinction is controversial, however, as many argue that traditional CBT and 
contextual approaches may operate through the same mechanisms (Arch & Craske, 2008; 
Herbert & Forman, 2013). Empirical findings regarding the specificity of mechanisms to 
contextual or traditional CBTs have been equivocal thus far (Arch et al., 2012; Niles et al., 2014; 
Forman et al., 2007), and extant studies have generally compared traditional CBT to acceptance-
based therapies, rather than those that include explicit and formal mindfulness training. 
Moreover, despite the insistence by some researchers that mindfulness represents a 
strategy for responding to emotions that is counter to the traditional CBT technique of 
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reappraisal, others suggest that mindfulness may even overlap with reappraisal. In cross-
sectional research, decentering has been shown to mediate the relationship between social 
anxiety and—separately—both reappraisal and mindfulness (Hayes-Skelton & Graham, 2013), 
suggesting at the very least that these constructs may share a mechanism. In a series of studies, 
Garland and colleagues have found that positive reappraisal is associated with dispositional 
mindfulness (as measured both by the FFMQ full scale and subscales) and years of meditation 
experience (Hanley & Garland, 2014; Hanley, Garland, & Black, 2014), self-reported state 
mindfulness on the TMS prospectively predicts use of positive reappraisal (Garland, Hanley, 
Farb, & Froeliger, 2013), and increases in self-reported reappraisal mediate the relationship 
between increased dispositional mindfulness and stress reduction (Garland, Gaylord, & 
Fredrickson, 2011).  
Because reappraisal is both considered a signature technique of traditional CBT 
(Hofmann, Heering, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2009; Beck, 1979) and a potential correlate of 
mindfulness (Hanley & Garland, 2014; Garland et al., 2013), however, it provides a particularly 
apt point of comparison when exploring the short-term effects of mindfulness training. Yet, aside 
from Keng et al. (2013), very few studies have been conducted to date directly comparing 
mindfulness and reappraisal instructions in a lab setting. Some studies comparing reappraisal to 
acceptance instructions have found minor advantages for reappraisal in down-regulating negative 
affect (Hofmann et al., 2009; Szasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 2011). Generally, however, such 
acceptance instructions have not included the explicit attentional training component of true 
mindfulness interventions. 
In one of the few extant comparisons, Shikatani and colleagues (2014) employed a 40-
minute mindfulness intervention modeled after existing experimental and treatment 
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implementations of mindfulness training, including a therapeutic rationale and psychoeducation 
(Roemer & Orsillo, 2009; Erisman & Roemer, 2010). Participants with social phobia completed 
a stressful public speaking task intended to elicit post-event processing (PEP), or negative 
retrospective review of one’s performance. Then they received either mindfulness, cognitive 
restructuring, or control instructions. Participants rated their level of PEP, state anxiety and state 
affect before and after the interventions and at follow-up one day later. While both mindfulness 
and restructuring reduced PEP and improved affect as compared to control, no differences were 
found in these measures between the active conditions (Shikatani, Antony, Kuo, & Cassin, 
2014).  Findings from the few direct comparisons of analogue reappraisal and mindfulness 
interventions thus suggest parity between these two techniques in their effect on negative affect. 
Notably, though, Shikatani et al. (2014) and Keng et al. (2013) used meditation 
instructions that emphasized the acceptance component of mindfulness. Although Keng et al. 
(2013) employed a relatively shorter intervention and some attentional training, their 
mindfulness script also included instructions in the acceptance of emotions. Emotional 
acceptance, while a core component of all definitions of mindfulness, is typically addressed in 
later sessions of long-term mindfulness interventions (e.g., Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). 
In the earlier stages of formal mindfulness training, practitioners typically spend significant time 
on focused-attention, or concentrative meditation, which emphasizes the self-regulation of 
attention and enhancing awareness of present-moment physical experience (Lutz et al., 2008). 
By including both focused-attention and emotional acceptance instructions, brief, laboratory-
based mindfulness interventions can perhaps better capture the complexity of mindfulness as a 
construct. Yet these broader instructions, especially when given to novices, arguably sacrifice 
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some ecological validity by asking participants to practice, in a short period of time, a range of 
meditative techniques that would be taught more gradually in a formal training program. 
This distinction between early and later formal meditation training is crucial in an 
experimental comparison of reappraisal and mindfulness. Mindfulness as it is practiced by 
experienced meditators might differ from reappraisal primarily because it deemphasizes 
cognitive elaboration and evaluation in favor of acceptance.  By contrast, mindfulness for novice 
meditators might be distinct from reappraisal more in its stipulation of a sustained attentional 
focus on affectively neutral stimuli like the bodily sensations of breathing. Thus it is essential for 
such comparative work to assess participants’ trait-level mindfulness and/or meditation 
experience as a potential covariate of a state mindfulness induction. 
1.5 Study Goals and Objectives 
The present study examined the immediate effects of brief reappraisal and mindfulness 
interventions on two potential mechanisms of traditional cognitive-behavioral and mindfulness-
based therapies: executive control, as assessed by sustained attention and inhibitory control on 
the Go/No-Go Task, and emotion regulation, operationalized as reduction in self-reported 
negative affect. As mentioned above, few studies have directly compared these two techniques in 
a laboratory setting or examined both affective and executive functioning effects within the same 
study, despite evidence that implicates attention and inhibition in mindful emotion regulation. 
Keng et al. (2013) conducted the one extant comparison that assessed both cognitive and 
affective effects, but the proposed study departed from and expanded on their findings in several 
crucial ways. First, the present study assessed mindfulness’ effects on sustained attention, which 
had not previously been studied in such brief interventions. Second, the study also measured 
state mindfulness following interventions, to assess the specificity of focused-breathing 
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meditation in enhancing this understudied construct. Finally, Keng et al. (2013) and others have 
generally used broader instructions in mindfulness, incorporating acceptance and guided 
imagery, that depart from the relatively narrow form of focused-breathing meditation typically 
taught to novices (Lutz et al., 2008). The present study investigated a focused-breathing 
mindfulness intervention, and compared its effects on sustained attention, inhibitory control and 
negative affect to those of cognitive reappraisal instructions.  
As a study of analogue clinical interventions, the study design generally prioritized 
internal validity at the expense of external validity.  Because previous findings of between-group 
differences in state decentering and curiosity (as measured by the TMS) have generally yielded 
small- to medium-size effects (Feldman et al., 2010; Alberts & Thewissen, 2011), efforts were 
made to minimize other potential sources of between-participant variability.  Although no theory 
or extant evidence suggests systematic sex differences in responsiveness to mindfulness 
interventions, some evidence suggests that women respond differently—both more severely and 
with a longer duration—to laboratory mood inductions than men (Albersnagel, 1988; Goodwin 
& Williams, 1982; Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994).  Recruitment was thus limited to female 
student participants.  
I hypothesized that the focused-breathing mindfulness and reappraisal would produce 
equivalent reductions in negative affect, as compared to mind-wandering control condition. 
Given findings that brief meditation can enhance inhibitory control in laboratory settings and 
longer-term mindfulness training improves sustained attention (e.g., Lee & Orsillo, 2014; 
Chambers et al., 2008), it was hypothesized that participants receiving mindfulness instructions 
would demonstrate greater sustained attention and inhibitory control, as compared to both 
reappraisal and no instructions. 
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2     METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 143 female undergraduate psychology students recruited from Georgia 
State University’s SONA psychology participant database (see Table 1 for full sample 
characteristics).  To meet inclusion criteria, participants had to be female, 18 years or older, and 
able to read and write English.  Of those, 136 completed all study procedures. Participants were 
generally of traditional college age (M = 19.87, SD = 5.82). The sample was racially diverse. 
Participants were permitted to identify themselves using more than one racial/ethnic category: 
56% identified as Black/African-American, 24.8% identified as Asian/Pacific Islander, 13.8% 
identified as White, 12.8% identified as Hispanic/Latino, 1.8% as Native American/American 
Indian, and 1.8% as Other. Racial/ethnic demographic data were also recoded as a single 
categorical variable, with participants reporting more than one racial/ethnic identity coded as 
“multiracial.” Based on this recoding, the sample was 9.2% Hispanic/Latino, 22.9% 
Asian/Pacific Islander, 6.4% White, 48.6%  Black/African-American, 0.9% other, and 10.1% 
multiracial, with 2 participants (1.8%) not reporting any ethnic or racial identity.  Participants 
were asked whether they currently meditate; 18.7% reported practicing some form of meditation.  
Of the total sample, 5.1% endorsed meditating on a monthly basis, 11.8% reported meditating 
weekly, and 1.5% reported meditating daily. 
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics and Means and Standard Deviations for Baseline  
Potential Covariates. 
 Full Sample All analyzed Mindfulness Reappraisal Control 
 (N = 136) (n = 109) (n = 36) (n = 36) (n = 37) 
Age 19.87 (5.82) 19.32 (3.07) 19.69 (4.83) 19.23 (2.04) 19.05 (1.27) 
Race/Ethnicity      
  Native American 2.2% 1.8% 2.8% 0% 2.7% 
   Latino/Latina 11% 12.8% 16.7% 11.1% 10.8% 
   Asian 34% 24.8% 19.4% 27.8% 27% 
   White 12.5% 13.8% 25% 2.8% 13.5% 
   Black/African-    
   American 
57.4% 56% 50% 55.6% 62.2% 
   Other 1.5% 1.8% 2.8% 2.8% 0% 
Currently Meditate 18.4% 15.6% 16.7% 16.7% 13.5% 
   Daily 5.1% 0.9% 0% 0% 2.7% 
   Weekly 9.6% 9.2% 5.6% 11.1% 10.8% 
   Monthly 3.7% 5.5% 11.1% 5.6% 0% 
GHQ-12 11.75 (5.21) 11.23  (4.92) 10.14  (3.45) 12.33  (5.85) 11.20  (5.05) 
ACS 53.38 (7.40) 53.51  (7.01) 54.10  (7.52) 51.22  (7.20) 55.15  (5.79) 
PHLMS-Ac 25.72 (7.82) 26.22  (7.51) 26.88  (7.49) 26.89  (7.69) 24.92  (7.38) 
PHLMS-Aw 38.00 (5.83) 37.83  (5.84) 38.44  (5.20) 36.28  (5.66) 38.73  (6.44) 
Note:  GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; ACS = Attentional Control Scale; PHLMS-Ac 
= Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale – Acceptance subscale; PHLMS-Aw = Philadelphia 
Mindfulness Scale – Awareness subscale. 
 
2.2 Materials and Design 
The study employed an experimental analogue design, with all procedures administered 
via computer (see Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the study design). Participants (N=136) 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: focused-breathing mindfulness (n = 43), 
cognitive reappraisal (n = 47), and mind-wandering control (n = 46). After baseline assessments 
and mood rating, participants completed a negative mood induction, followed by a second mood 
rating. Next, in the intervention phase, participants listened to audio-recorded training and 
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practice instructions in their assigned emotion regulation (or control) strategy. An assessment of 
state mindfulness and a third mood rating followed the intervention. Finally, participants 
completed the Go/No-Go task, a behavioral measure of sustained attention and inhibitory 
control, as well as demographics measures. 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of experimental design. 
 
 
 
Mindfulness Reappraisal Control 
  Time 3 Mood Rating 
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2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Trait mindfulness.   
The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS; Cardaciotto et al., 2008) was used to 
examine participants’ dispositional, or trait mindfulness. The PHLMS is comprised of 20 items 
based on the Bishop et al. (2004) and Kabat-Zinn (1994) definitions of mindfulness. Consistent 
with the Bishop model, the PHLMS has two 10-item subscales assessing awareness (e.g., “When 
I am startled, I notice what is going on inside my body”) and acceptance (e.g., “If there is 
something I don’t want to think about, I’ll try many things to get it out of my mind”). 
Respondents rate items on a 5-point, Likert-type scale (1 = “never,” 5 = “very often”) based on 
how often they experienced each in the past week. Awareness items are summed to obtain a 
subscale score, with higher scores indicating greater awareness, while acceptance items are 
reverse-scored before summing, with higher scores reflecting greater acceptance. Both the 
acceptance and awareness subscales have good internal consistency in non-clinical (α ranging 
from .75 to .86) and clinical (α = .75 for both subscales) samples (Cardaciotto et al., 2008; 
Butryn et al., 2011). In a student sample, both acceptance and awareness subscales were 
significantly correlated with scores on the MAAS, while only awareness scores were correlated 
with the MAAS in a general psychiatric sample (Cardaciotto et al,. 2008). In a non-clinical 
sample, acceptance scores were negatively correlated with thought suppression, rumination and 
depressive symptoms (Cardaciotto et al., 2008), while awareness scores were correlated with 
response-time variability on a continuous performance task (Ruocco & Direkoglu, 2013). Both 
total scores and subscale scores from the PHLMS have been used previously (Ruocco & 
Direkoglu, 2013). For the present study, the acceptance (PHLMS-Ac) scale demonstrated good 
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internal consistency (α = .87), while the awareness scale (PHLMS-Aw) demonstrated acceptable 
internal consistency as well (α = .78). 
2.3.2 State mindfulness. 
The Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau et al., 2006) was used both as a manipulation 
check, to verify that the meditation group  demonstrated greater state mindfulness relative to the 
comparison conditions at post-intervention. The TMS is a self-report measure intended to assess 
state mindfulness retrospectively, with respect to a preceding period of actively practicing 
mindfulness. Explicitly developed to fit the Bishop et al. (2004) model of mindfulness, the TMS 
consists of 13 statements, rated on a four point scale (0 = “not at all, 4 = “very much”), 
describing what the respondent “just experienced.” Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses 
supported a two-factor structure. The 7-item Decentering subscale assesses “awareness of one’s 
experience with distance and disidentification rather than being carried away by one’s thoughts 
and feelings,” while the 6-item Curiosity subscale reflects “awareness of present moment 
experience with a quality of curiosity” (Lau et al., 2006, p. 1452). Sample decentering items 
include “I was open to taking notice of anything that might come up,” and “I experienced myself 
as separate from my changing thoughts and feelings.” Sample curiosity items include “I was 
curious about my reactions to things” and “I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings 
I was having.” Lau and colleagues (2006) report internal consistencies (Cronbach’s α) of .84 for 
the Decentering scale and .86 for the Curiosity scale in an adult sample with meditation 
experience ranging from zero to 17 years. In a recent study of 10-minute mindfulness 
instructions with a nonclinical student sample, internal consistencies were .52 for Decentering, 
.85 for Curiosity, and .76 for the total TMS score (Ortner & Zelazo, 2014). Other studies with 
non-meditating students have obtained Cronbach’s α of .83 to .90 for Curiosity and .63 to .69 for 
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Decentering (Quickel, Johnson, & David, 2014; Erisman & Roemer, 2010; Frewen, Lundberg, 
MacKinley, & Wrath, 2011). For the present sample, the Curiosity subscale had a Cronbach’s α 
of .87 and the Decentering subscale had a Cronbach’s α of .74. 
2.3.3 Psychological distress. 
Total scores on the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12; Goldberg, 1978) were 
examined as a potential covariate to control for baseline between-condition differences in 
psychological distress. The GHQ-12 is a self-report assessment of general psychological health. 
Participants rate the frequency with which they experience various behavioral and psychological 
stressors on a 4-point, Likert-type scale, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (much more than usual). 
Scores range from 0 to 36, with higher scores indicating greater psychological distress. In other 
studies with the proposed study population, the GHQ-12 has demonstrated adequate internal 
consistencies of .87 and .88 (Masuda, Price, Anderson, Schmertz, & Calamaras, 2009; Masuda & 
Wendell, 2010). In the present study, the GHQ-12 also demonstrated adequate internal 
consistency (α = .83). 
2.3.4 Trait attentional control. 
Baseline levels of attentional control, measured by the Attentional Control Scale (ACS; 
Derryberry & Reed, 2002), were examined as another potential covariate. The ACS is a 20-item, 
self-report measure of trait-level attentional control. Items assessing the ability to focus (e.g., 
“When trying to focus my attention on something, I have difficulty blocking out distracting 
thoughts”) and shift attention (e.g., “I have trouble carrying on two conversations at once”) are 
rated on a 4-point, Likert-type scale (1 = “almost never,” 4 = always”). Exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses support a two factor model, composed of focusing and shifting 
factors (Olafsson et al., 2011). In a recent study with a healthy student sample internal 
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consistency was adequate (α = .77), and total scores on the ACS were moderately correlated with 
trait mindfulness as measured by both the FFMQ and MAAS (Brown, Goodman, & Inzlicht, 
2013). For the present study, internal consistency was also adequate (α = .80). 
2.3.5 Negative affect.  
At three time points, participants used a computer-displayed Visual Analogue Scale 
(VAS) to indicate their current level of sadness. A horizontal line, with numbered and descriptive 
anchors on opposite ends (0 = Not at all sad, 100 = Extremely sad) was displayed and 
participants were prompted to move a sliding indicator to the position that best reflected their 
current mood. The VAS is a widely used method of rapidly assessing within-subject changes in 
negative and positive affect and has shown sensitivity to affective changes following brief 
mindfulness, reappraisal, worry and rumination inductions (e.g., Arch & Craske, 2006; Keng et 
al., 2013; Singer & Dobson, 2007). Visual analog scales assessing changes in state anxiety have 
demonstrated good test-retest reliability and sensitivity to a variety of laboratory stressors, as 
well as concurrent validity with multiple-item self-report scales (for a review, see Rossi & 
Pourtois, 2012). Psychometric data on VAS assessing mood are more limited; Ahearn and 
Carroll (1996) found evidence for good test-retest reliability over 1 hour in a clinical sample. 
2.3.6 Sustained attention and inhibitory control. 
Total omission and commission errors on the Go/No-Go Task (Mueller & Piper, 2014) 
were used to assess participants’ sustained attention and inhibitory control, respectively. The 
Go/No-Go Task is a free, open-source implementation in the Psychology Experiment Building 
Language (PEBL; Mueller & Piper, 2014) of a computerized continuous performance task 
assessing sustained attention and inhibitory control (see Figure 2 for a screen shot of the 
computer program). Participants are required to respond to target letters by pressing a keyboard 
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button while refraining from responding to non-targets. Targets and non-targets are presented 
sequentially, in a pseudorandom order, with letters appearing in one of four quadrants of a square 
in the center of the screen. Each stimulus presentation lasts 500 milliseconds, with an inter-
stimulus interval of 1500 milliseconds. The PEBL version has two conditions: in the first 
condition, the target letters are Ps, and non-targets are Rs.” In the second condition, target and 
non-target rules are reversed, but the ratio of Ps to Rs remains the same (80:20, P:R), so that the 
first condition assesses performance with high frequency targets and the second with low-
frequency targets. Each condition consists of 160 trials (presentation of a single stimulus), for a 
total of 320 trials and approximate task duration of 8 minutes. A brief training phase precedes 
each condition, and on-screen instructions inform participants that they are permitted to take a 
brief break between the first and second conditions. 
 
Figure 2. Screen shot of Go/No-Go Task (Mueller & Piper, 2014). 
 
 Omission errors, or failures to respond to a target, are believed to index 
inattention; thus fewer omission errors are indicative of greater sustained attention. Commission 
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errors, or responses to non-targets, are considered an index of impulsivity or failure of inhibitory 
control (Barkley, 1991).  
 Parameters for the PEBL Go/No-Go are identical to those used by Bezdjian et al. 
(2009) in a study of impulsivity and inattention in children. That study found that commission 
errors were significantly inversely related to hyperactivity/impulsivity symptom ratings and hit 
reaction times, suggesting that commission errors are a valid index of impulsive responding. 
Omission errors have also been examined, in both Bezdjian et al.’s version of the Go/No-Go and 
other continuous performance tasks, as an index of sustained attention (Barkley, 1991).  
2.4 Mood Induction  
After completing a battery of self-report measures including the potential covariates 
listed above, participants completed a modified, negative autobiographical recall exercise based 
on a model by Brewer, Doughtie, and Lubin (1980). Participants were prompted to think and 
then write about three negative life events that made them feel “sad,” “defeated,” “lonely,” 
“rejected,” or “hurt.” As the addition of music has been found to enhance the effectiveness of the 
mood induction procedures (e.g., Clark, 1983; Martin, 1990; Westermann, Spies, Stahl & Hesse, 
1996), participants also listened to a 10-minute audio recording of mood-suggestive music 
(“Adagio in G-minor,” by Albinoni) while completing the mood induction procedures. Such a 
combined procedure has previously been effective at inducing negative mood in depressed 
(Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009), sub-clinically depressed (Keng et al., 2013), and healthy 
undergraduate participants (Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). 
2.5 Experimental Manipulations 
Instructions for the mindfulness condition (see Appendix E) were adapted from scripts 
used by Kiken and Shook (2011) and Keng et al. (2013), which were themselves adapted from 
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frequently used instructions by Singer and Dobson (2007) and Arch and Craske (2006).  To align 
the mindfulness intervention with the focused-attention meditation instruction typically provided 
to novices (Lutz et al., 2008; Segal et al., 2002), these instructions emphasized the self-regulation 
of attention and awareness of present-moment experience, with less explicit emphasis on the 
nonjudgmental acceptance of that experience.  The combined instructions directed participants to 
focus their attention on the present-moment sensations of their breath (e.g., “focus your 
awareness on the physical sensations of your breathing”). The instructions also explained that 
unpleasant thoughts or feelings may arise (“You may notice… that your mind has wandered…is 
instead lost in thought or preoccupied with a feeling. These thoughts may be pleasurable, or they 
may be unpleasant.”).  The instructions normalized this process and encouraged participants to 
accept these thoughts or feelings (“This is normal, and there’s no need to judge it.”).  The 
instructions then stipulated that participants should “gently” refocus their attention on their 
breath. 
The reappraisal instructions (see Appendix F) were adapted from those used by Keng et 
al. (2013). Participants were directed to try thinking of positive aspects of one of the negative life 
events they recalled previously or to imagine what an external observer would think of the event. 
In the mind-wandering control condition (see Appendix G), participants received instructions, 
based on those used by McHugh et al. (2012), to sit quietly, allow their thoughts to roam freely 
and wait for additional instructions after a brief period. To control for demand characteristics 
unrelated to the distinguishing features of the two active interventions (mindfulness and 
reappraisal), instructions in all conditions began with a brief rationale for the relevant approach 
to regulating emotions and included reminder statements interspersed with periods of silence.  In 
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addition, instructions were matched for duration (10 minutes) and approximate word count (608 
words for mindfulness, 613 words for reappraisal, 426 words for mind wandering). 
2.6 Procedures 
All experimental procedures were conducted in Dr. Masuda’s laboratory space and 
administered via computer. Participants meeting inclusion criteria were assigned (via quasi-
random assignment) to one of three conditions: mindfulness, reappraisal or control. To determine 
the order in which participants were assigned to conditions, a random sequence of numbers 
(integers ranging from 1 to 3, each corresponding to an experimental condition) was generated 
using an online tool. This sequence was matched to a list of participant numbers. Self-report 
measures, mood induction, interventions and the cognitive flexibility task were all administered 
by computer. On-screen prompts directed participants to notify the experimenter when assistance 
was needed (e.g., when opening the computer program to administer the Go/No-Go Task). 
Participants completed baseline questionnaires (PHLMS, GHQ, and ACS) and a baseline VAS 
mood rating (Time 1), and then were prompted to put on headphones and listen to a series of 
audio exercises. First, all participants received 10-minute mood induction instructions prompting 
rumination about a negative life event. After completing a second mood rating scale (Time 2), 
participants heard 10-minute audio instructions specific to their assigned intervention. Following 
the intervention, participants rated their mood a third time, completed the state mindfulness 
assessment (TMS), and then completed the Go/No-Go Task. 
2.7 Data Analysis  
All preliminary and main statistical analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 
21 for Windows.  
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2.7.1 Potential covariates.   
Demographic variables (race, age, meditation practice) and baseline self-report measures 
(trait mindfulness, psychological distress, and attentional control) were examined as potential 
covariates in the main analyses. First, between-condition differences were assessed for each 
potential covariate. Categorical variables were evaluated with chi-square tests.  Continuous 
variables were evaluated with ANOVAs if they met assumptions of linearity, normality, and 
homoscedasticity.  Significant omnibus ANOVAs were further explored with post hoc tests.  For 
continuous variables not meeting ANOVA assumptions, non-parametric tests were used.  Any 
potential covariate with significant between-group differences was then examined further to 
assess the presence of a significant relationship to the outcome variables in the main planned 
analyses.  In the case of categorical variables, ANOVAs were used to assess significant 
differences in outcome variables based on the potential covariate, with a significant ANOVA 
indicating inclusion of that covariate in analyses of the relevant outcome variable.  For 
continuous variables, zero-order correlations between the potential covariate and outcome 
variable were examined.  In the event of a significant correlation, the continuous covariate was 
included in all analyses involving the outcome variable with which it was significantly 
associated. 
2.7.2 Data transformations and manipulation check. 
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Self-report outcomes (VAS sadness ratings at all three time points, TMS scale scores) 
were examined for normality and homoscedasticity, using skewness and kurtosis statistics, as 
well as normality plots and histograms.  Variables for which skewness or kurtosis values or 
normality plots indicated significant concerns regarding non-normality or heteroscedasticity 
were transformed, using a square-root transformation.  For variables with a high number of zero 
scores (e.g., VAS sadness ratings), the square-root transformation was performed after first 
adding a constant (i.e., x1 = √(x + 1)). The transformed variables were then examined for the 
same assumptions. 
2.7.3 Between-group differences in sadness. 
A 3 (Condition [mindfulness, reappraisal, mind-wandering control]) × 3 (Time) repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the effect of condition on VAS sadness ratings 
before mood induction, after mood induction, and after the intervention phase.  Planned contrasts 
(weights: 1, 1, and -2, for mindfulness, reappraisal, and control, respectively) were employed to 
examine significant between-group effects, while pairwise comparisons were used to examine 
significant within-group effects.  If the assumption of sphericity was not met, either Greenhouse-
Geisser or Huynh-Feldt corrected degrees of freedom and p values were used.  A power analysis 
was conducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to determine an 
adequate sample size for detecting a small effect size (f = .15, alpha = .05) for a 3 × 3 repeated-
measures ANOVA.  The power analysis indicated that a sample size of 93 was necessary to 
detect a small effect with a power of .80. 
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2.7.4 Between-group differences in sustained attention and inhibitory control. 
For Go/No-Go task outcome measures (Omission or Commission errors) meeting 
assumptions of normality, one-way ANOVAs with post-hoc comparisons were conducted to 
examine the effect of condition on sustained attention and/or inhibitory control. 
 
3     RESULTS 
3.1 Mood induction manipulation check.   
Of the 136 participants who completed all study procedures, 27 (19.9%) reported a 
reduction or no change in sadness from the Time 1 to Time 2 VAS mood ratings and were 
excluded from subsequent analyses.  There were no significant differences between conditions in 
the number of participants excluded for failing to meet the mood induction criterion, χ2(2, N = 
136) = 0.72, p = .70. 
3.2 Missing data.   
Item-level missing data analysis was conducted for all self-report measures and indicated 
that 14 participants (12.84%) had one or more missing item values. The total number of missing 
values was 17, which represented 0.24% of the total number of values, and no variable had more 
than 1.5% missing values. The maximum number of missing values for a single participant was 
3. Using estimation-maximization (EM) methods, missing values were imputed was used to 
impute missing values (Schafer & Graham, 2002).  
Due to administrative error, Go/No-Go task data were incomplete for one additional 
participant. This participant’s data were excluded from analyses of the main Go/No-Go 
outcomes (omission and commission errors; indices of sustained attention and inhibitory 
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control), leaving a sample size of N = 108.  However the participant’s data were included in 
analyses of self-report outcomes (VAS sadness ratings and TMS scores). 
3.3 Preliminary analyses 
Table 1 displays demographic characteristics for the 109 participants meeting mood 
induction criteria. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences between conditions in 
participant age. Using racial identity recoded as a single variable, a chi-square analysis revealed 
no significant differences in the distribution of participant race between conditions.  Similarly, 
chi-square analyses indicated no significant between-condition differences in the number of 
participants endorsing current meditation practice or in the number of participants reporting 
daily, weekly, or monthly meditation practice (all ps > .05).  
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for baseline measures and primary outcome 
measures. Baseline levels of psychological distress (i.e., GHQ), trait mindfulness (i.e., PHLMS) 
and attentional control (i.e., ACS) were examined for between-group differences that might 
influence response to the experimental manipulation. Visual inspection of box plots and 
Levene’s test for equality of variances indicated significant concerns regarding heteroscedasticity 
in GHQ scores across conditions. Normal P-P and Q-Q plots and normality tests were also 
indicative of significant concerns regarding the assumption of normality for PHLMS scores in 
the mindfulness and control conditions. Thus separate nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis tests were 
conducted for PHLMS and GHQ scores across all three conditions. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
indicated that distributions for GHQ across conditions were not significantly different (p = .302) 
and that PHLMS scores were distributed similarly across conditions as well (p = .582), 
suggesting no significant baseline differences between groups in psychological distress or trait 
mindfulness. 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for Primary Outcome Measures, for Overall 
Sample and by Condition. 
 Overall Mindfulness Reappraisal Control 
 (N = 109) (n = 36) (n = 36) (n = 37) 
VAS 1 12.72  (18.13) 11.47  (13.48) 17.61  (21.98) 9.19  (17.36) 
VAS 2 39.01  (26.70) 39.06  (24.87) 39.81  (26.31) 38.19  (29.38) 
VAS 3 18.74  (19.88) 18.08  (19.19) 22.53  (20.40) 15.68  (19.96) 
Mood Induction 26.28  (20.54) 27.58  (16.96) 22.19  (18.73) 29.00  (24.87) 
Intervention -20.28  (17.34) -20.97  (13.16) -17.28  (15.1) -22.51  (22.30) 
TMS-Curiosity 21.02  (4.72) 20.33  (5.29) 20.72  (3.62) 21.97  (5.03) 
TMS-Decentering 22.49  (4.44) 22.14  (4.30) 21.64  (3.59) 23.67  (5.13) 
Go/No-Go Comissions 9.20  (5.347) 8.83  (4.99) 8.69  (5.60) 10.30  (5.29) 
Go/No-Go Omissions 2.47  (14.76) 0.64  (1.52) 0.80  (1.11) 1.76  (3.77) 
Note: Statistics for Go/No-Go Omission and Commission errors in Reappraisal condition 
exclude one participant for whom data were incomplete due to administrative error (n = 35). 
VAS = Visual Analog Scale sadness rating; Mood Induction = change score in Visual Analog 
Scale sadness from Time 1 to Time 2; Intervention =  Visual Analog Scale sadness change score 
from Time 2 to Time 3; TMS = Toronto Mindfulness Scale. 
 
Based on visual inspection of normality plots and tests for normality and 
homoscedasticity, ACS, PHLMS-Aw, and PHLMS-Ac scores met assumptions required for 
ANOVA.  A MANOVA was conducted on PHLMS-Aw and PHLMS-Ac scores.  Using Pillai’s 
trace, there was no significant effect of condition on acceptance or awareness scores, V = .05, 
F(4, 212) = 1.23, p = .28.  Results from a one-way ANOVA on ACS scores indicated a 
significant omnibus difference in mean ACS scores across all three conditions, F(2, 106) = .318, 
p < .05.  Post-hoc comparisons using a Bonferroni correction revealed that baseline attentional 
control was significantly greater in the mind wandering control than in the reappraisal condition 
(p < .05). 
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Table 3 displays bivariate correlations between all baseline measures and all primary 
outcome measures. Regarding potential covariates, ACS scores were significantly related to 
sadness VAS ratings at Time 1 and Time 3, such that greater attentional control was associated 
with lower sadness (p < .01). Because of the baseline difference in attentional control between 
the control and reappraisal conditions, ACS scores were included as a covariate in subsequent 
between-groups analyses of VAS sadness ratings. Because no potential covariates were 
significantly related to Go/No-Go outcomes (Omission or Commission errors; indices of 
executive control), none were included in analyses. 
Table 3. Bivariate Correlations among all Baseline and Outcome Measures. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. VAS1 1            
2. VAS2 64** 1           
3. VAS3 68** 76** 1          
4. Commis .01 .12 .05 1         
5. Omiss -.08 -.01 -.07 -.14 1        
6. GHQ .61** .37** .48** -.06 .05 1       
7. ACS -.37** -.17 .26** -.02 .07 -.45** 1      
8. PHLMS-Ac -.32** -.22* .21* -.01 .06 -.43** .26** 1     
9. PHLMS-Aw .03 .07 .09 -.11 .06 .00 .29** -.20** 1    
10. PHLMS -.26** -.24* - .24* -.09 .09 -.38** .42** .74** .51** 1   
11. TMS-C .19* .18 .13 -.03 .02 .13 -.05 -.17 .14 -.06 1  
12. TMS-D .10 .10 .13 -.05 .08 -.05 .12 -.14 .23** .03 .61** 1 
13. TMS .16 .16 .01 -.04 .06 .05 .04 -.17 .20** -.02 .90** .89** 
Note: N = 109. *p < .05, ** p < .01. Commis = Go/No-Go Total Commission Errors; Omiss = 
Go/No-Go Total Omission Errors; TMS-C = Toronto Mindfulness Scale – Curiosity Subscale; 
TMS-D = Toronto Mindfulness Scale – Decentering Subscale 
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3.4 Mindfulness manipulation check 
As a manipulation check to assess the effectiveness of the mindfulness intervention in 
increasing state mindfulness, a MANCOVA was conducted with TMS-Decentering and TMS-
Curiosity scores as the dependent variables, group as the between-subjects variable, and ACS 
scores entered as a covariate. No significant omnibus effects were obtained, indicating that there 
were no differences between conditions in state decentering or curiosity following the 
intervention phase. Implications of this null finding are explored further in the Discussion. 
3.5 Hypothesis 1: Equivalent reductions in negative affect across mindfulness and 
reappraisal, as compared to control 
Hypothesis 1 was evaluated using a 3 (Condition) × 3 (Time) repeated-measures 
ANCOVA, with VAS mood ratings as the dependent variable, and ACS scores included as a 
covariate.  Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(2) = 
12.68, p = .002, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of 
sphericity (ε = .93).  Results indicated that, when controlling for baseline attentional control, 
sadness ratings did not significantly differ as a function of time, F(1.91, 196.61) = 1.47, p = .23, 
η2partial = .014.  Because the main effect of time was not significant, interactions and planned 
contrasts were not interpreted.  Figure 3 displays the marginal means for VAS sadness ratings by 
condition, controlling for baseline attentional control.  Visual inspection of the marginal means 
suggested that, across conditions, mean sadness ratings with the mood induction (Time 1 to Time 
2) and then decreased with the intervention (Time 2 to Time 3).  Indeed, across conditions, the 
change in mean sadness from Time 1 (M = 12.72, SD = 18.13) to Time 2 (M = 39.01, SD = 
26.70), represented a large effect size (d = 1.09), as did the change in mean sadness from Time 2 
to Time 3 (M = 18.74, SD = 19.88; d = -0.812). 
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Figure 3. Estimated marginal mean sadness VAS ratings by condition, controlling for 
baseline attentional control. 
 
3.6 Hypothesis 2: Mindfulness increases sustained attention and inhibitory control over 
reappraisal and control 
Based on inspection of normality plots and skewness and kurtosis statistics, the 
assumption of normality was justified for Go/No-Go Commission errors (i.e., the index of 
impulsivity or failures of inhibitory control).  Levene’s test suggested that the assumption of 
homoscedasticity was also justified, F(2, 105) = 0.31, p = .74.  Thus, a univariate ANOVA was 
conducted to evaluate the effect of condition (mindfulness vs. reappraisal vs. control) on Go/No-
Go Commission errors.  There were no significant differences between condition in mean 
number of Commission errors was not significant, suggesting that the groups did not differ in 
inhibitory control following the intervention phase, F(2, 105) = 1.03, p = .36.   
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Normality plots and tests indicated that the distribution of Omission errors (i.e., the index 
of sustained attention) was significantly non-normal in all three conditions, with skewness values 
of 3.06 (SE = .39) in the mindfulness condition, 1.94 (SE = .40) in the reappraisal condition, and 
3.5 (SE = .40) in the control condition.  Levene’s test indicated significant concerns with 
heteroscedasticity, F(2, 105) = 4.00, p < .05.  With similar sample sizes across groups, ANOVA 
can be considered robust to violations of normality and heteroscedasticity (Schmider, Ziegler, 
Danay, & Buhner, 2010; Rogan & Kesselman, 1977).  Given the similar sample sizes in each 
condition, a univariate ANOVA was conducted on Go/No-Go Omission errors. The omnibus 
effect of condition on Omission errors was not significant F(2, 105) = 2.22, p = .11, η2partial = .04.  
Despite the nonsignificant omnibus finding, the small-to-medium effect size for condition 
suggests some relationship between condition and sustained attention on the Go/No-Go task. 
Despite the reputation of ANOVA as robust to violations of the normality assumption, 
other analytic methods may be more appropriate to the analysis of such positively skewed data. 
In particular, low-frequency count data such as Go/No-Go omission errors may not be 
appropriately analyzed with ANOVA methods because they are bounded at zero. Transforming a 
skewed dependent variable using a log or square-root transformation and then using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression is an option as well. However, this method has been found 
inadequate for count data with large numbers of zero scores, as found in the current sample.  
Models based on the Poisson distribution have been found to be appropriate for such frequency 
data (Swartout, Thompson, Koss, & Su, 2015). Negative binomial regression in particular is 
appropriate for over-dispersed count data, for which the conditional variance exceeds the 
conditional mean at most levels of a predictor. 
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Negative binomial regression was performed on total omission errors with participant 
condition as the single categorical predictor.  Model results are displayed in Table 4. Maximum 
likelihood estimation was used for parameter estimates.  The overall model was significant, χ2(2) 
= 6.45, p < .05.  The dispersion parameter was estimated at 2.24, 95% CI [1.35, 3.71].  The 
confidence interval for this parameter indicated that Go/No-Go Omission errors were likely over-
dispersed and that the negative binomial distribution is thus a better fitting approximation of the 
sample data than the Poisson distribution.  As compared to the control condition, assignment to 
the mindfulness condition was significantly negatively associated with omission errors. Model 
parameters in a negative binomial model can be exponentiated and interpreted as incident rate 
ratios (IRR), indicated the degree to which the incidence of the outcome count variable changes 
with respect to a change in the predictor. For the categorical predictor of participant condition in 
the present model, the IRR for a particular condition represents the change in incidence of 
Go/No-Go omission errors from the reference category (control). The mindfulness intervention 
was associated with a nearly two-thirds lower rate of omission errors, as compared to control, 
IRR = 0.36, 95% CI [.158, .838].  Assignment to the reappraisal condition, as compared to 
control, was not significantly associated with a change in the incidence of omission errors, 
although this relationship approached significance, p = .06, IRR = 0.46, 95% CI [0.20, 1.04].  
When the model was re-run with reappraisal coded as the reference group, mindfulness was not 
associated with a significant change in omission error rate, p = 0.62, IRR = 0.8, 95% CI [0.33, 
1.93].  Mind wandering was marginally significantly associated with increased omission errors, p 
= .06, IRR = 2.2, 95% CI [0.97, 4.99].  Thus, based on results of the negative binomial 
regression model, assignment to the mindfulness condition was associated with significant 
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improvement in sustained attention, as indexed by Go/No-Go task omission errors, as compared 
to the control condition. 
Table 4. Negative Binomial Regression Models Predicting Total Go/No-Go Omission 
errors. 
Variable b S.E. p 95% CI IRR 95% CI 
Model 1 
    
  Condition = Mindfulness -1.01 0.43 0.02 [-1.85, -0.18] 0.36 [0.15, 0.84] 
Condition = Reappraisal -0.79 0.42 0.06 [-1.61, 0.03] 0.45 [0.2, 1.04] 
Condition = Control 0 
   
  Model 2 
    
  Condition = Control 0.79 0.42 0.06 [-0.03, 1.61] 2.2 [0.97, 4.99] 
Condition = Mindfulness -0.23 0.45 0.62 [-1.11, .66] 0.8 [0.33, 1.93] 
Condition = Reappraisal 0 
   
  Note: N = 108; χ2(2) = 6.45, p < .05. 
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4 DISCUSSION 
The current study sought to compare the effects of brief, laboratory-based mindfulness and 
reappraisal training on experimentally-induced sad mood, sustained attention and inhibitory 
control.  Given the experimental literature supporting the effectiveness of both mindfulness and 
reappraisal (e.g., Keng et al., 2013; Wolgast, Lundh, & Viborg, 2011; Arch & Craske, 2006; 
Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009), I hypothesized that both strategies would reduce sadness as 
compared to a mind-wandering control condition, with no difference in sadness reduction 
between the two active conditions.  Results did not support this hypothesis.   Based on findings 
from previous analogue experiments (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005; Keng et al., 2013; Lee & Orsillo, 
2014), I also hypothesized that mindfulness training would increase sustained attention and 
inhibitory control as compared to either reappraisal or mind-wandering.  Results partially 
supported this hypothesis, regarding the effect of mindfulness training on sustained attention as 
compared to the mind-wandering control condition. 
4.1 Group Differences in Sadness Ratings 
Contrary to my hypothesis, no significant main effects or interactions of time or condition 
on sadness rating were found, when controlling for baseline attentional control.  Equivalent 
levels of post-intervention sadness in the mindfulness and reappraisal conditions were expected, 
and this finding is consistent with the few other extant comparisons of these techniques in a 
laboratory setting (Keng et al., 2013; Shikatani, et al., 2014).  However, the absence of any 
benefit to mindfulness or reappraisal with respect to mind-wandering is unexpected.  Mind-
wandering or no-instructions control conditions have often been found to be inferior to 
mindfulness in reducing negative affect (Keng et al., 2013; Arch & Craske, 2006; Singer in 
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Dobson, 2007).  Moreover, mind-wandering has independently been associated with negative 
affect (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010).   
Several alternative accounts might help explain the null finding.  One possibility is that 
the mind-wandering condition was in fact as effective as the mindfulness and reappraisal 
conditions. Studies in both clinical and nonclinical samples have suggested that 10-minute 
instructions to engage in mood-incongruent distraction—without a specific object of focus—can 
reduce experimentally-induced sadness, in some cases as effectively as mindfulness or 
reappraisal (Singer & Dobson, 2007; Broderick, 2005).  Rather than engaging in sadness-
congruent rumination following the sad-mood induction, participants in the mind-wandering 
condition may have instead been distracted by positive or affectively neutral thoughts that 
improved their affect (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1989).    
In addition to mind-wandering being more efficacious, it is also possible that the two 
active conditions were less efficacious in reducing the experimentally-induced negative mood 
than anticipated.  More specifically, it is possible to speculate that the active interventions were 
too brief in length or “dosage” to alter the process that they were intended to influence (e.g., state 
mindfulness), at least for the present sample.  Although significant effects of brief mindfulness 
training on negative affect have been found in comparison to mind-wandering in previous 
analogue experimental studies (Arch & Craske, 2006; Lee & Orsillo, 2014), there is variability in 
findings between novice and experienced meditator samples. Differential effects between 
mindfulness and control conditions may not reliably emerge at the level of such brief 
interventions or such a low “dosage.”  As will be discussed in greater detail below, the absence 
of between-condition differences in state mindfulness raises the possibility that the interventions 
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were inadequate to target and selectively increase the state mindfulness construct specified by 
the state mindfulness scale (i.e., the Toronto Mindfulness Scale) used for the present study.  
Another possibility is that nonspecific features of the control instructions accounted for 
its parity with the active conditions.  Unlike many other experimental comparisons of 
mindfulness to mind-wandering, the present study matched the mind-wandering instructions to 
the active conditions on certain nonspecific factors.  Instructions for mind-wandering presented it 
as “a strategy for dealing with negative emotions,” asked participants to sit in a comfortable and 
upright position, and offered a putative clinical rationale for the strategy (“Sometimes we don’t 
have time to let our minds wander or think through everything with all that goes on. … 
Sometimes we want some time just to think”).  The instructions were roughly matched with the 
two active conditions for word count and included brief reminder prompts throughout the 10-
minute intervention phase.  Instructions for all three conditions were also read by the same voice 
in a relaxing manner.  A significant, if controversial, body of literature (Rosenzweig, 1936; 
Wampold et al., 1997; Wampold, 2007; Marcus, O’Connell, Norris & Sawaqdeh, 2014) supports 
the efficacy of nonspecific factors in psychotherapy, such as clinical rationale and therapist 
warmth.  It is possible that the apparent benefits of brief mind-wandering for sadness found in 
this study reflect an exceptionally “robust” or active control condition. 
4.1.1 Manipulation check and state mindfulness.   
The absence of a significant main effect of condition on sadness ratings should also be 
understood within the context of the state mindfulness manipulation check.  No differences were 
found between conditions in either decentering or curiosity following the intervention phase.  
Because the TMS was not administered prior to intervention, it is impossible to determine 
whether state mindfulness changed as a result of the interventions.  Although the PHLMS is a 
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measure of trait, and not state, mindfulness, the lack of baseline differences in either PHLMS 
subscale suggests that participants entered with equivalent propensities to experience states of 
mindful awareness and acceptance.  Thus it is possible that the training instructions did not 
successfully or specifically target the independent variable of interest: state mindfulness, as 
measured by the TMS subscales of curiosity and decentering.  In particular, the present study’s 
mindfulness instructions prioritized the first element of the Bishop et al. (2004) definition, self-
regulation of attention, in asking participants to maintain their focus on their breath, notice when 
their mind wandered, and redirect their attention.  The attitudinal component of the Bishop et al. 
(2004) definition—a curious and nonjudgmental orientation to experience—was expressed in the 
intervention as well, through instructions not to “fight” upsetting thoughts, not to “judge” 
instances of mind-wandering and to redirect attention “gently.”  These aspects may have been 
underemphasized, though, as compared to the structure of the TMS subscales, which primarily 
capture the attitudinal aspect of mindfulness (Lau et al., 2006). 
Although use of the TMS as a manipulation check in laboratory settings has been limited, 
a number of studies have found higher TMS total (Garland et al., 2013; Alberts & Thewissen, 
2011) or decentering scores (Feldman et al., 2010; Erisman & Roemer, 2010) following a brief 
mindfulness intervention, as compared to mind-wandering, thought suppression, no instructions, 
education control, relaxation, or compassion meditation.  Mindfulness instructions in the present 
study were similar to those used in some of these same studies.  For example, mindfulness 
instructions in all of the studies finding intervention-specific effects on state mindfulness 
included an emphasis on attending to the physical sensations of breathing, noticing and accepting 
instances of mind-wandering, and gently redirecting attention back to the breath.  In some cases, 
instructions also included descriptions of applying mindfulness to accept difficult emotions 
49 
(Erisman and Roemer, 2010) or imagery to facilitate mindful awareness of thoughts (“like clouds 
passing in a clear blue sky”; Garland et al, 2013).  It is unclear, however, whether these more 
extensive instructions contributed to the higher TMS scores.  In fact, Feldman et al. (2010) found 
post-mindfulness intervention levels of decentering comparable those in the current study using a 
mindful breathing instructions that excluded any techniques thought to induce decentering 
through demand effects (e.g., labeling thoughts, visualizing thoughts as images, explicit 
descriptions of decentering).  Using similarly narrow mindfulness instructions, Frewen et al. 
(2011) also found mean levels of post-mindfulness decentering and curiosity comparable to those 
in all three conditions of the current study. This suggests that the mindfulness audio intervention, 
as delivered, may have been adequate to induce state mindfulness.  
Aside from Feldman et al. (2010), however, the other studies finding higher TMS scores 
following mindfulness practice employed neutral (e.g., no instructions, education) or analog-
pathological (e.g., suppression) comparison conditions.  None compared mindfulness to 
reappraisal.  Although not hypothesized in this study, finding equal levels of decentering 
following both mindfulness and reappraisal is consistent with theory underlying mindfulness-
based cognitive therapy, which holds that decentering is a common mechanism of mindfulness 
and traditional CBT (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002).  Successful cognitive reappraisal 
requires one to view thoughts as mutable and not fixed aspects of one’s experience; successful 
reappraisal may require a disidentified perspective on thought analogous to that achieved through 
mindfulness practice.  Indeed, some cross-sectional evidence suggests that decentering mediates 
the effects of both mindfulness and reappraisal on social anxiety (Hayes-Skelton & Graham, 
2013). 
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 The finding that decentering was equivalent after both mindfulness and mind-
wandering, however, runs counter to theory that considers mindfulness and mind-wandering to 
be antithetical (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012).  As described by 
Bishop and colleagues (2004), the state of mindfulness involves noticing one’s thoughts and 
stopping mind-wandering—even if temporarily—by returning the attention to an original object 
of focus.  They argue that it is precisely this activity of cutting off mind-wandering that allows 
for a decentered perspective on cognition to develop (Bishop et al., 2004). 
 Interestingly, though, experimental support for the superiority of brief 
mindfulness over mind-wandering in inducing decentering is limited. Garland et al. (2013) found 
differences between mindfulness and mind-wandering instructions in their effects on overall 
TMS scores but did not report finding differences at the subscale level.  Erisman and Roemer 
(2010) found decentering increased following mindfulness instructions, as compared to a neutral 
education audio control condition. Ortner and Zelazo (2014) found no significant advantage in 
decentering following mindfulness as compared to no instructions and found that decentering 
was significantly higher following distraction (guided imagery) than either other condition.  Thus 
the present study contributes to an equivocal body of findings on the effectiveness of brief 
mindfulness instructions at increasing decentering. Future research is needed to clarify the 
conditions under such increases can be found, with special attention paid to the quality of 
comparison conditions. 
Yet another consideration regarding the absence of the between-group differences in state 
mindfulness is potential variability in participant compliance with specific intervention 
instructions.  Participants assigned to one condition may have attempted to regulate their 
experimentally-induced sadness using another technique.  Random assignment might have 
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somewhat mitigated this threat.  It is plausible, however, that participants assigned to the 
mindfulness and mind-wandering conditions might have been more likely to engage in non-
assigned emotion regulatory strategies.  Given that mindfulness was novel to the majority of 
participants, those assigned to the mindfulness condition may have been more likely to revert to 
more familiar methods of downregulating sadness.  Mind-wandering, because it demanded less 
active attentional engagement from participants, may have been particularly conducive to 
participants’ use of non-assigned regulatory techniques.  As will be discussed in greater detail 
later, a key limitation of the present study’s design is the failure to assess participants’ adherence 
to their assigned instructions. 
4.1.2 Duration of mood induction effects. 
As noted above, it is also possible that the reduction in sadness at Time 3 indicated by 
effect size and visual inspection was simply the result of a naturalistic return to baseline. 
Especially in nonclinical student samples, laboratory-based mood induction procedures have 
been found to have a relatively brief duration.  Data are lacking regarding the duration of 
negative moods induced through the combined music and autobiographical recall procedures 
used in the present study.  The 10-20 minute Velten procedure bears many similarities to the 
combined procedure, though, and has been studied more extensively.  Among healthy students, 
negative affect increases immediately following a Velten depression induction procedure but 
quickly decreases again (Frost & Green, 1982), returning to pre-induction levels as soon as 6-12 
minutes into a post-induction waiting period (Chartier & Ranieri, 1989).  This pattern is also 
evident when a Velten or music mood induction is followed by a cognitive task: self-reported 
negative affect diminishes quickly, nearly reaching pre-induction levels after 10 minutes 
(Albersnagel, 1988; Eich et al., 2007).  Thus is it is possible that, rather than reflecting the 
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equivalent efficacy of mindfulness, reappraisal, and mind-wandering at reducing sadness, these 
findings instead merely demonstrate that healthy people tend to recover from induced mood 
rather rapidly. 
4.2 Differences in Sustained Attention and Inhibitory Control   
Results partially supported the hypothesis that mindfulness would increase sustained 
attention and inhibitory control over reappraisal and mind-wandering.  Mindfulness was 
associated with a nearly two-thirds reduction in the rate of omission errors on the Go/No-Go task 
as compared to control, suggesting that mindfulness improved sustained attention as compared to 
mind-wandering.  However, no such reduction in omission errors was evident for mindfulness 
when compared to reappraisal.  In addition, no significant differences were found between 
conditions in the mean number of commission errors, indicating that the interventions had 
equivalent effects on inhibitory control. 
4.2.1 Sustained attention. 
The substantial improvements in sustained attention for mindfulness as compared to 
mind-wandering are consistent with theory that enhanced attentional vigilance is a key 
mechanism of mindfulness (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003; Bishop et al,. 2004).  This finding 
contributes to a limited body of empirical literature regarding the effects of mindfulness on 
sustained attention (Chiesa, Calati, & Serretti, 2011).  Only one laboratory-based study (Mrazek, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012) has examined sustained attention performance following a brief 
mindfulness intervention.  Using the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), a version of 
a Go/No-Go test, Mrazek and colleagues (2012) found that 8-minute mindful breathing practice 
reduced both SART errors—analogous to Go/No-Go omissions—and reaction time variability, 
as compared to minimal-instructions reading and passive relaxation comparison conditions.  
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They interpret this as evidence that mindfulness reduces mind-wandering.  Morrison et al. (2014) 
found a similar improvement in SART omission errors by healthy students following a 7-week 
mindfulness training program, as compared to waitlist control.  A relationship between increased 
mindfulness and sustained attention has also been found with cross-sectional research, using the 
Continuous Performance Test, a measure of vigilance and inhibition with similar duration and 
structure to the Go/No-Go task (Schmertz et al., 2009).  Such a benefit was not found in a 
randomized clinical trial of MBSR and wait-list control, however (Anderson et al., 2007). 
The apparent improvements of mindfulness over control should be interpreted with 
caution, in light of the absence of a significant difference in sustained attention between 
mindfulness and reappraisal.  Common features of the two active conditions, and their distinction 
from control, might also account for the higher rate of attentional lapses in the control condition.  
The mindfulness and reappraisal intervention scripts both provided participants with a more 
specific object of attention (sensations of breathing or upsetting thoughts and evidence 
for/against them) than in the control condition.  Both mindfulness and reappraisal instructions 
also provided a relatively structured sequence of mental steps for participants to follow.  
Mindfulness and reappraisal were more likely to be novel techniques for participants and perhaps 
thus more likely to continue to elicit attentional engagement from participants.  It is possible, too, 
that the observed difference in omission errors only between mindfulness and control reflects the 
detrimental impact of mind-wandering on sustained attention (for a review, see Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006). 
However, the parity between reappraisal and mindfulness conditions in sustained 
attention performance is consistent with the view that, in novice meditators, mindfulness 
functions as a top-down emotion regulation strategy similar to cognitive reappraisal (Chiesa et 
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al., 2013).  As the majority of participants reported no current meditation practice, those in the 
reappraisal and mindfulness conditions may have both engaged in effortful control of attention to 
downregulate their negative affect. 
4.2.2 Inhibitory control. 
Mindfulness did not differ from the comparison conditions in inhibition performance, as 
indexed by Go/No-Go commissions.  Although laboratory-based studies have found post-
intervention differences in inhibitory control following relatively brief mindfulness training 
(Keng et al., 2013; Lee & Orsillo, 2014; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005), these findings have been limited 
to Stroop task errors.  As the Stroop task requires verbal responses, these previous findings might 
be taken to indicate the effects of short-term mindfulness training in enhancing inhibition of 
verbal prepotent responses.  By contrast, commission errors on the Go/No-Go task used in the 
present study indicate failure to inhibit a prepotent motor response.  Thus the failure to find a 
significant between-group difference in commission errors might only indicate that brief 
mindfulness training is insufficient to improve inhibitory control on motor tasks. 
4.3 Limitations. 
The present study had several notable limitations, some of which have been addressed 
previously.  Many aspects of the study design privileged internal over external validity, yet there 
were also numerous threats to internal validity.  Chief among these is uncertainty regarding the 
success of the experimental manipulation.  Because no differences in state mindfulness measured 
by the TMS were found, it cannot be definitively established that the intervention selectively 
increased that form of state mindfulness in the present mindfulness condition.  This limitation 
could have been addressed by use of either a repeated-measures design (with the TMS 
administered prior to mood induction) or manipulation check questions assessing participants’ 
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use of different emotion regulation strategies during the intervention phase (Aldao, 2013).  A 
manipulation check assessing the use of a variety of assigned and non-assigned strategies would 
also have served to assess for potential demand effects. 
 Although theoretically distinct from mindfulness, the mind-wandering control 
instructions had some areas of overlap with the two active conditions (e.g., clinical rationale) that 
were not theoretically specified.  Because no significant between-group differences were found 
in sadness or state mindfulness, it is unclear whether the overlapping or distinct aspects of the 
different instructions account for the equivalent results across condition.  Including a fourth 
condition with minimal mind-wandering instructions would have helped to clarify this 
ambiguity. 
 While helpful in limiting participant burden and facilitating the assessment of 
presumably transient effects, the use of a single-item measure of sadness and a single post-
intervention measurement point also severely limits the generalizability of these findings.  The 
internal consistency of single-item measures cannot be assessed.  In addition, negative mood 
inductions often increase a variety of moods (e.g., anxiety as well sadness; Martin, 1990), and 
assessing a broader range of moods would have permitted the assessment of between-condition 
differences in the initial negative mood induced or the intervention response.  Data from the 
single post-intervention sadness rating indicate that groups did not differ in sadness immediately 
following the intervention phase, but the lack of subsequent ratings leaves ambiguous whether 
groups followed the same trajectory in recovering from the sad mood. 
Theories of mindfulness-based interventions generally do not specify distinct processes in 
clinical and non-clinical populations (Baer, 2003).  Nevertheless, extrapolation of these findings 
to clinical interventions is severely limited by the present study’s use of a nonclinical, student 
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sample.  Caution must also be applied when extrapolating from the present study’s all-female 
sample to mixed-gender populations.   
In addition, the heterogeneity of current meditation practice in the study sample must be 
considered when extrapolating these findings to either all-novice or experienced-meditator 
populations.  Although the majority of participants reported no current meditation practice, and 
only a small proportion (1.5%) reported practicing on a daily basis, past meditation experience 
was not explicitly assessed.  Given that mechanisms of mindfulness training may differ by level 
of experience (Chiesa et al., 2013), it is possible that varying levels of experience—not captured 
by the PHLMS—contributed to the null findings or significant between-group difference in 
sustained attention. 
4.4 Implications and directions for future research.   
Overall, findings from the present study contribute to the variable literature on 
laboratory-based brief mindfulness interventions.  In particular, the absence of an effect of 
condition on changes in sadness underscores the importance of selecting theoretically distinct 
comparison conditions.  Theoretically distinct active comparisons, such as reappraisal or 
relaxation, can clarify important areas of overlap or divergence in mechanisms, but it is also 
essential to include an “inactive” control condition.  The present study failed to establish a 
comparison between active conditions as well as those between active and non-active conditions.   
The use of manipulation checks is also essential.  Laboratory studies should assess state 
mindfulness before and after training, as well as assessing for adherence to assigned training 
instructions.  One promising option for strengthening the internal validity of mindfulness 
manipulations is behavioral assessment of breath-counting (Levinson et al., 2014).  Breath-
counting, which typically includes instructions to sustain attention on the breath as well as to 
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notice and gently shift away from mind-wandering, is a common beginning method for teaching 
mindfulness (Lutz et al., 2008) and could be implemented as a behavioral manipulation check on 
mindfulness instructions or even as a brief mindfulness intervention itself.  Levinson and 
colleagues (2014) have developed a computerized breath-counting task with preliminary 
construct validity evidence: task performance correlated with self-reported trait mindfulness, 
differentiated experienced meditators from controls, and was inversely associated with 
attentional capture by positively-valenced stimuli.  Such a task with a clear sustained attention 
component might be especially appropriate for assessing adherence and response to focused-
breathing meditation instructions like those used in the present study.  Multi-modal assessment 
of state mindfulness, using behavioral and self-report data, could further clarify the relationships 
between mindfulness, reappraisal and aspects of state mindfulness such as decentering. 
 Further exploration of the immediate effects of brief mindfulness training on 
attentional control is also warranted.  A significant effect of mindfulness, as compared to mind-
wandering, was found for sustained attention, but no effect was found for inhibitory control.  As 
stated above, differences in task demands may account for the discrepancy between this finding 
and other experimental studies finding an effect of mindfulness on inhibition. Studies using other 
inhibition tasks may help bolster or further qualify previous findings regarding the benefits of 
brief mindfulness training on inhibition.  Using a Stroop task modified to require a motor 
response would be particularly instructive, as most studies finding such a benefit for mindfulness 
used the verbal Stroop task (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005; Keng et al., 2013; Lee & Orsillo, 2014), unlike 
the present study’s motor Go/No-Go task.   
Differences in the content and context of mindfulness interventions could also account 
for this discrepancy.  Of the laboratory studies finding effects of mindfulness on inhibition, two 
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(Wenk-Sormaz, 2005; Lee & Orsillo, 2014) used narrowly-tailored breath meditation 
instructions similar to those in the present study.  Neither of those studies employed the 
mindfulness intervention in the context of an experimentally-induced sad mood, however, while 
Keng et al. (2013) did but also employed more elaborate mindfulness instructions with visual 
metaphors and greater emphasis on acceptance.  It is conceivable that, in the presence of an 
induced sad mood, extended mindfulness instructions with a more explicit acceptance 
component are necessary to produce the greater inhibitory control observed by Keng and 
colleagues (2013).  
Electrophysiological evidence, particularly the study of event-related potentials (ERPs), 
offers a way of further contextualizing performance on cognitive tasks.  A number of studies 
have examined the relationship of mindfulness to ERP components during tasks like the Stroop 
(Cahn & Polich, 2006).  Preliminary ERP evidence suggests that trait mindfulness is associated 
with differences in momentary affective responding to performance feedback on these tasks 
(Teper & Inzlicht, 2014).  Thus it is possible that participants receiving a brief mindfulness 
intervention might perform equally well as those practicing reappraisal or mind-wandering on a 
test of attentional control and yet demonstrate different, diminished affective responses to their 
errors. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This study examined the short-term effects of brief mindfulness instructions on 
experimentally-induced sadness, sustained attention, and inhibitory control.  Extant research has 
suggested that mindfulness can reduce negative affect and enhance attentional control in 
laboratory settings, with respect to control (e.g., mind-wandering, education) or maladaptive 
(e.g., rumination, worry) comparison conditions.  Results from this study partially support these 
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prior findings.  Mindfulness did not alter sadness, as compared to either reappraisal or mind-
wandering.  Participants in the mindfulness condition demonstrated better sustained attention, 
but not inhibitory control, than mind-wandering (but not reappraisal) on a computer-based 
performance task.  The pattern of between-condition differences is complicated by the absence of 
any between-group differences in state mindfulness following the intervention phase.  Overall, 
these findings support the value of further investigations into attentional mechanisms of 
mindfulness-based interventions, while also underlining the importance of carefully selecting 
comparison conditions and manipulation checks with the potential to distinguish between-
condition differences. 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A  Mindfulness Training Instructions 
Mindfulness Training Instructions  
(608 words; adapted from Kiken & Shook, 2011; Keng et al., 2013) 
  
In this next phase of the study, you will learn how to use a strategy for dealing with 
negative emotions. We call this technique “mindfulness.”  
  
Start by finding a comfortable position in your chair with your feet flat on the floor and 
your back straight but not stiff or straining.  Resting your hands on the top of your thighs.  
Finding a position that is alert while relaxed.  Closing your eyes if that feels comfortable. 
What mindfulness involves is simply paying attention to our experience in the present 
moment, in the “here and now,” without judgment. 
  
Typically, when we experience upsetting thoughts or emotions, we tend to think about 
them over and over again: We judge them as good or bad, or we try to push them away so that 
we don’t have to deal with them. The technique of mindfulness is not to struggle with upsetting 
thoughts or emotions, but just to be aware of them and let them be, as we pay attention to what 
we are experiencing moment-to-moment.  
 
Now, I’m going to ask you to gently bring your attention to the sensations of your own 
breathing. We’re going to use your breathing like an anchor, to help you pay attention to your 
experience in the present moment.  
 
As best you can, focus your awareness on the physical sensations of your breathing. You 
might notice the air moving in and out through your nose, or the feeling of your belly rising and 
falling, as you inhale and exhale. See if you can follow those sensations all the way, for the full 
length of your in-breath… and the full length of your out-breath. 
  
It may seem hard at first to shift your focus from the upsetting thoughts and emotions you 
were experiencing earlier. Don’t try to fight them off, just try to pay attention to your in-breath, 
following it all the way in, and following your out-breath all the way out. Notice the physical 
sensations in your body as you breathe: the expansion in your chest, your abdomen, or your 
back. Notice any tension, or any feelings of relaxation, in your body. Notice how those 
sensations change as you breathe in and out. 
 
You may notice, at some point, that your mind has wandered, that your awareness is no 
longer with your breathing, but is instead lost in thought or preoccupied with a feeling. These 
thoughts or feelings may be pleasurable, or they may be unpleasant. This is normal, and there’s 
no need to judge it. If you notice that your awareness has shifted from your breath, simply 
acknowledge the thoughts or feelings and let them go. Just gently redirect your awareness back 
to your breath.  
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This technique is all you need to do during this exercise.  If you happen to think this is 
silly or boring, let those momentary thoughts be and then, gently, return to the process of 
noticing each breath in each moment.   
 
Now, you will be given some quiet time to continue with this exercise.  Every now and 
then during this quiet time, you will hear some reminders.  Please continue to attend to the 
feelings of each breath in and out, until you hear instructions to stop. 
 
Gently maintain attention on your breathing, being with each breath in for its full 
duration and each breath out for its full duration. 
 
If your mind wanders, acknowledge that it has wandered to reconnect to the present, and 
gently shift your attention back to noticing the feeling of each breath.  
 
 
[End]  
This exercise is now over.  When you feel ready, you may open your eyes if they were 
closed. Then, ask the experimenter for the next directions. 
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Appendix B  Reappraisal Training Instructions 
Reappraisal Training Instructions 
(613 words; adapted from Keng et al., 2013) 
  
In this next phase of the study, you will learn how to use a strategy for dealing with 
negative emotions. We call this technique “reappraisal”.  
  
Start by finding a comfortable position in your chair with your feet flat on the floor and 
your back straight but not stiff or straining.  Resting your hands on the top of your thighs.  
Finding a position that is alert while relaxed.  Closing your eyes if that feels comfortable. 
What reappraisal involves is changing the way we think about events that upset us. 
  
Typically, when we experience upsetting thoughts and emotions, we tend to have 
negative interpretations about the event that triggers them: We tell ourselves that whatever 
happened was bad, that it means something bad about us or about the world or the future. The 
technique of reappraisal is to change the way we interpret the event, so that we don’t feel as 
negatively about it. Reappraisal is trying to develop a more positive interpretation about a 
situation that—at first glance—may appear very negative to us.  
  
There are many ways we can change our interpretations of a situation. We can start, for 
example, by asking, “Is this the only way I can think about the event or the situation?” “Is there a 
more positive way of thinking about the event so that I feel less negatively about it?” “What 
could be another way to look at what happened?”  
 
We can also challenge our negative thoughts or interpretations of an event by questioning 
those thoughts, by asking ourselves, “What evidence do I have that says this thought or this 
interpretation is true?” “Is this thought consistent with my experience in other situations?” “Do I 
have evidence that this thought isn’t true?” 
  
Imagine that you have a friend who always smiles or says “Hi” to you whenever you run 
into each other. Now, imagine that one time, you run into this friend, but instead of smiling or 
saying hello, they just walk past you without smiling. How might you feel if this happened? One 
interpretation of this situation would be, “My friend ignored me on purpose.” If you interpreted 
the situation this way, you might even think that you did something to offend your friend or 
make them angry. You might feel angry or insulted, or perhaps sad or even lonely.  
 
But with a different interpretation of that event, you might not feel this way. If you had 
the interpretation, “My friend must not have seen me,” or “My friend was probably distracted or 
in a hurry,” then you might instead think about what was happening in your friend’s life. You 
might feel concerned for your friend, or you might simply not get as upset. 
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Now, let’s practice the technique of reappraisal. Think back to the previous exercise, 
when you recalled three sad events in your life. Pick one of those events, and try to recall the 
thoughts and feelings that came up for you while remembering that sad experience.  
 
How did you interpret that sad event?  
 
Are there other ways, more positive ways, that you could interpret that experience? 
 
If you can, try to imagine how another person, someone with a different point of view, 
might interpret that experience. 
 
Consider the evidence for your interpretation. Do you have any other evidence about this 
event, evidence that would support a more positive view of it? 
 
Spend the next few minutes practicing this technique of reappraisal. You can try to 
reappraise the other two sad events from the previous exercise, too. 
 
[End]  
This exercise is now over.  When you feel ready, you may open your eyes if they were 
closed. Then, ask the experimenter for the next directions. 
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Appendix C Mind-Wandering (Control) Conditions 
Mind-wandering (Control) Instructions 
(426 words; adapted from Kiken & Shook, 2011, and McHugh et al., 2012) 
 
In this next phase of the study, you will learn how to use a strategy for dealing with 
negative emotions. The strategy is to let your mind wander freely. 
 
Start by finding a comfortable position in your chair with your feet flat on the floor and 
your back straight but not stiff or straining.  Rest your hands on the top of your thighs.  Find a 
position that is alert while relaxed.  Close your eyes if that feels comfortable. 
 
We’re going to ask you to think about whatever comes to mind, without having to focus 
on anything in particular.  Take this time to follow your thoughts and feelings – whatever you 
want to think about – as you do when you have time to think things through thoroughly.  For 
example, sometimes we think about ideas for later in the day or week to organize our plans.  Or, 
sometimes we think about something that happened earlier in our day.  You may have a lot to 
think about, maybe important things, or your mind might just wander to anything.  Either way, 
take time to think about whatever you want. Just let your mind think and wander freely. 
 
We are simply giving you time to let your mind wander freely through all your thoughts.  
Sometimes we don’t have time to let our minds wander or think through everything with all that 
goes on.  Yet everybody has their own interests, concerns and ideas that occupy their thoughts 
when they have time.  Sometimes we want some time just to think.  So, during this time, you can 
let your mind go wherever it wants as time passes.  Continue to let yourself think about whatever 
you want to.   
 
That is all you need to do during this exercise.  It’s that simple.  Use the time to let your 
mind wander and think freely without needing to focus hard on anything in particular.  Even if 
you zone out a bit, that’s okay.  Now, you will be given some quiet time to continue with this 
exercise.  Every now and then during this quiet time, you will hear some reminders.  Please 
continue to let your mind wander and think freely during this time. 
 
 
Remember: this is time for your mind to wander freely.   
 
You don’t have to think about one thing; think about as many different things as you 
want. 
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Don’t focus too hard on anything.  Think freely. 
 
[End] 
This exercise is now over.  Slowly open your eyes if they are closed, and take a moment 
if you need one.  Then, turn the computer monitor back on and click continue.  
 
 
 
